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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN SOVEREIGN CREDIT RISK
Thomas J. Plank
Urban J. Jermann
This dissertation investigates aspects of sovereign credit risk in advanced and emerging
economies. It consists of two chapters.
Chapter 1 studies the determinants of sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads for
16 advanced economies during the recent financial crisis. We document that the state of
the world financial system, and since the beginning of the crisis, the state of a country’s
domestic financial system, have strong explanatory power for the behavior of CDS spreads.
Furthermore, the magnitude of this effect depends on the relative importance of a country’s
financial system pre-crisis. We also find that CDS spreads behaved differently for countries
in the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union (EMU). Although the level of
spreads is lower for member countries, their sensitivities to the health of the financial system
are higher compared to non-EMU members. Our results suggest the presence of a private-
to-public risk transfer through which market participants incorporate their expectations
about financial industry bailouts and the potential burden of government intervention.
Chapter 2 studies the extent to which macro-economic variables govern the dynamics
of emerging market sovereign CDS spreads. In this chapter, I propose a structural model
of sovereign credit risk based on a country’s access to international capital flows through
exports, imports and international reserves. Using these macro-fundamentals, I define a
sovereign’s ability to pay as the maximum amount of foreign currency available for re-
payment of external debt. The joint dynamics of the ability to pay and the amount of
outstanding debt determine the level of default risk and thus the sovereign CDS spread.
iii
I implement the model for a sample of six emerging economies for a period covering the
recent financial crisis. A calibrated version of the model captures the widening of sovereign
spreads during the crisis and provides a good fit for their time-series dynamics. Lastly, I
use the model to measure the market-implied level of country liabilities. On average, the
value of implied external debt is 13% larger than the reported level of debt.
iv
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Chapter 1
Default Risk of Advanced
Economies: An Empirical Analysis
of Credit Default Swaps during the
Financial Crisis
Joint with Stephan Dieckmann
1.1 Introduction
The collapse of US and global real estate prices in 2007 initiated an international financial
crisis which subsequently spread to the real economy. Established financial institutions in
the US and Europe suffered large losses, driven by write-downs related to sub-prime mort-
gages, a decline in the availability of credit and damaged investor confidence. While central
banks expanded monetary policy and engaged in quantitative easing in an effort to stabilize
the economy, governments provided unprecedented levels of public financial assistance to
ailing institutions. As fiscal concerns following government-funded stabilization programs
come to the fore, the sovereign credit default swap (CDS) market for advanced economies
has become less obscure and increasingly liquid. Out of the ten largest single name CDS
1
exposures by net notional, seven are now European advanced economies.1 Furthermore,
since September 2009 investors can trade index products on a basket of Western Euro-
pean sovereign CDS in addition to the long-standing emerging markets and corporate CDS
indices.
While CDS on emerging market debt have received much attention in the literature,
research on the credit risk of more advanced economies has been sparse. Our analysis
builds on the work of Boehmer and Megginson (1990) and Edwards (1984), who focus on
the determinants of the yield spreads of emerging market debt, as well as Longstaff, Pan,
Pedersen and Singleton (2009), who examine the sources of commonality in emerging market
CDS spreads. In contrast to the emerging markets literature, we study the determinants of
the price of insurance against default of developed nations, using a new data set containing
CDS spreads of 16 advanced economies.
The cross-section of these sovereign CDS spreads exhibits a strong degree of common-
ality. The first principal component of spread changes explains roughly 74% of variation,
whereas the first three principal components cumulatively account for 89%. We document
that, above and beyond the factors of commonality suggested by Longstaff et al. (2009),
the state of the world financial system, and since the beginning of the recent financial crisis
also the state of a country’s domestic financial system, have strong explanatory power for
the behavior of CDS spreads. This finding suggests a private-to-public risk transfer through
which market participants incorporate their expectations about financial industry bailouts
and the potential burden of government intervention. Our interpretation is motivated by
Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001), who argue that the principal cause of the 1997
Asian currency crisis was the future deficits associated with implicit bailout guarantees to
the failing domestic financial system. Similarly, European countries extended significant
1As of 1/30/2009. Source: HSBC.
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amounts of loans to local banks in order to prevent large bank failures, partially recapi-
talized financial institutions by taking equity stakes and outright nationalized firms which
posed a systemic risk to the economy. These actions may have led market participants to
assume government guarantees on the liabilities of the financial sector, and in many cases
these liabilities were large. Ireland’s aggregate bank assets between 2003 and 2006, for
example, were on average almost five times as large as its GDP. Such explicit assistance to
failing banks, large-scale support programs as well as implicit government guarantees may
have led to a repricing of advanced economies’ sovereign CDS.
Our analysis relies on the empirically observed correlation patterns between sovereign
CDS spreads and the stock market performance of the local and global financial services
industry.2 We formulate and test four hypotheses related to a potential private-to-public
risk transfer.
First, we show that the magnitude of this economic channel depends on the relative
importance of a countrys financial system pre-crisis. CDS spreads of countries whose do-
mestic economies relied heavily on the financial services industry pre-crisis show a stronger
co-movement with the health of the domestic and international financial system. This re-
sult is consistent with popular belief about governments absorbing risks of private sectors
during the recent crisis and may not seem surprising. However, to our knowledge, we are
the first to quantify this economic channel.
Secondly, we analyze two sources of country heterogeneity: whether a country is a
member of the Monetary and Economic Union of the European Union (EMU) and how
exposed a country’s financial system was to the sub-prime mortgage sector. The level of CDS
spreads is, on average, 50-70bps lower for countries in the EMU, which is consistent with
2Even though one could, in principle, investigate the joint evolution of sovereign and financial sector CDS
spreads, we choose to examine financial system stock market returns. This does not change the correlation
patterns due to the strong negative relation between CDS spread and stock price.
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results based on government yields as in Lund (1999). But we also show EMU countries’
sensitivities to shocks to the global and local financial system are higher compared to
non-EMU members, suggesting the private-to-public risk transfer was larger for countries
operating under a supra-national monetary authority. Specifically, the sensitivities of EMU
member countries are twice as large compared to non-EMU members – possibly a reflection
of those countries’ inability to individually control Euro money supply. The second source of
country heterogeneity we study is a country’s exposure to the sub-prime mortgage sector.
Since we do not observe bank-level holding data on sub-prime mortgage securities, we
estimate countries’ exposure to this sector through a correlation study of domestic financial
firms’ returns and the ABX.HE index – a popular index tracking the price performance
of sub-prime securities. We find that a country’s exposure to the US sub-prime mortgage
sector does not significantly alter the magnitude of the private-to-public risk transfer. This
seems surprising given the widely-held belief that the roots of the current crisis and much
of the associated losses can be traced to the sub-prime sector. However, we acknowledge
that this finding could also be due to an imprecise measure of sub-prime risk exposure.
Lastly, the importance of the financial sector should also be reflected in CDS spread
levels, not only in changes, and investigating levels has the advantage that we can control
for a country’s indebtedness. A deterioration of the financial system might lead to lower
levels of output, or additional debt issuance may be needed to finance government deficits
associated with a risk transfer, thus increasing leverage. For example, high budget deficits
and an ailing economy in Greece led to a significant widening of CDS spreads since December
2009, fueling the discussion about a potential credit event. We find that a country’s pre-
crisis exposure to the financial system explains on average 39bps, above and beyond its
debt to GDP ratio explaining 26bps. While such a difference appears large, it is of course
an ex-ante perspective – government guarantees that were triggered should be reflected in
4
country-specific fundamentals ex-post. We employ a battery of explanatory variables that
market participants might use in assessing the distance to a country’s default barrier. For
example, a countries’ stock market volatility matters, which is consistent with predictions
that arise from an ability-to-repay model as in Claessens and Pennacchi (1996). In addition,
the impact of stock market volatility has increased substantially in magnitude during the
financial crisis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 describes the data
and discusses the mechanics of the Western European sovereign CDS market. Section 1.3
studies the co-movement between the performance of the financial system and sovereign
CDS spreads, in the time series and the cross section as well as in changes and in levels.
Section 1.4 concludes.
1.2 Data Description
The raw data in this study consists of sovereign CDS spread levels at the 10 year maturity
mark. For the empirical analysis we use both weekly spread levels, denoted CDSit, as well
as changes, denoted ∆CDSit. We first discuss the mechanics of the sovereign CDS market
and then proceed to characterize the dataset. For an in-depth discussion of the pricing and
modeling of CDS contracts see, for example, Duffie and Singleton (2003) or Hull and White
(2000).
1.2.1 Mechanics of the Sovereign CDS Market
A sovereign CDS is a bilateral over-the-counter agreement between two parties to exchange
cash-flows based on future contingencies. The CDS seller provides insurance to the buyer
in case a credit event occurs in an obligation issued by the reference entity. In exchange for
credit protection, the CDS buyer pays an amount equal to the spread times the notional
to the protectional seller on a semi-annual basis for the maturity of the contract or the
5
occurrence of a credit event, whichever is sooner. In case a credit event occurs, the CDS
buyer pays the accrued coupon for the period and delivers the defaulted obligation to the
seller for a payment of par value (physical settlement), or receives the difference between
par value and the market price (cash settlement). Important for our case, the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) defines a credit event for a sovereign issuer as
obligation acceleration, failure to pay, restructuring or repudiation/moratorium.
For a bond to qualify as the reference obligation, it should be a deliverable obligation as
defined by ISDA. In the case of emerging markets sovereign CDS, only bonds issued non-
domestically in a standard specified currency (USD, Euro, Yen, Canadian dollar, Franc,
and Pound) are considered admissible3. This is similar in the case of Western European
sovereign CDS – if a country has outstanding foreign currency debt issued in a standard
specified currency, these bonds are considered to be deliverable obligations. However, if a
sovereign does not have any outstanding foreign currency debt, the deliverable obligation is
the domestic local-currency debt. Lastly, in the case of Eurozone sovereigns, EUR denomi-
nated debt is considered a deliverable obligation, alongside any other foreign currency debt
in one of the standard currencies. In the case of a credit event, the post-event market price
of the underlying is determined through an auction process. It is generally not possible to
physically deliver outside the auction process. Instead, protection buyers can deliver into
the auction or cash settle off the auction price. Likewise, protection sellers can take delivery
from the auction or cash settle off the auction price.
In order to mitigate counterparty risk, parties can be asked to post cash-equivalent
collateral. However, the possibility remains that a credit event on an advanced industrial
country would coincide with a severe market disruption, rendering one or both of the coun-
terparties unable to fulfil their contractual obligations. We acknowledge that such jump
3See Pan and Singleton (2008)
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to default risk exists and point to two mitigating factors with respect to our study: First,
banks will generally not trade the CDS contract on their domestic sovereign due to correla-
tion risk. Second, a negative shock to the financial system should decrease the conditional
expected payoff of a CDS contract solely from the perspective of counterparty risk. How-
ever, we find that the empirical correlation between sovereign CDS spreads and the state
of the financial sector is robustly negative. Thus, even if counterparty risk were priced in,
it only would serve to strengthen our results.
1.2.2 The Dataset
We utilize proprietary data from the credit trading desk of a large US bank, containing end-
of-day 10-year sovereign CDS mid-quotes for 16 countries from January 2003 to September
2009.4 All quotes are based on the USD-denominated CDS contract. The countries covered
are the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK. All countries are
classified as advanced economies by the IMF, with the exception of Hungary. Out of the
16 countries, 10 are members of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and
thus share the EURO as their common currency. Of the remaining six countries, five are
members of the European Union. The spread data is recorded at a daily frequency and
indicates whether a trade has taken place in the instrument during that day. We only use
observations for our analysis if the CDS contract was indeed traded.
We use both weekly spread levels as well as changes which yields a total of 1,901 country-
week observations for levels and 1,523 country-week observations for non-overlapping changes.
Table 1.1 shows summary statistics in basis points.
Of the countries in our sample, 12 traded in single digit spreads at the beginning of the
4Anecdotal evidence from conversations with traders suggests that the 10 year maturity contract is the
most liquid on the Western European sovereign CDS term structure. However, our results are robust to
using 5 year CDS spreads.
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sample period, whereas all 16 countries traded in double or triple digit spreads at the end
of the sample. Furthermore, there is a wide dispersion of average premia within the sample:
average spreads are as low as 20.8bps in the case of Germany or as high as 141.1bps in the
case of Ireland. The standard deviation of spread changes highlights further differences:
France exhibits a weekly volatility in spread changes of 4.8bps versus Ireland’s 29.4bps.
Although countries in the sample are geographically clustered (with the exception of Israel),
we can observe a high degree of cross-sectional variation, both in levels and changes, which
may partially be a reflection of differing degrees of credit quality across countries.5
It is also instructive to graphically examine the time series properties of CDS spreads.
Figure 1.1 plots the level of spreads from January 2007 to September 2009. Prior to the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on the 15th September 2008, CDS spreads for most coun-
tries are relatively stable and exhibit low correlation cross-sectionally. Since the bankruptcy,
however, sovereign CDS strongly move together and rise to unprecedented levels. Most
sovereign spreads peak at the beginning of March 2009, shortly after AIG announced a
fourth quarter loss of $61.7bn, the largest quarterly loss in corporate history at the time.
Ireland’s credit swap spread, for example, peaked at 369bps, a more than hundredfold in-
crease over its pre-crisis lows. Even Germany experienced a CDS spread more than 30 times
the magnitude of its 2006 levels.
1.2.3 Principal Component Analysis
Figure 1.1 suggests there existed strong co-movement in CDS spreads across countries dur-
ing the financial crisis. To further quantify the degree of such commonality, we conduct a
principal component analysis in the spirit of Longstaff et al. (2009). The results of this
5In our sample, seven countries hold AAA Standard & Poor’s (S&P) credit ratings, three countries are
rated AA and the remaining six countries are rated A and below. The country with the lowest S&P credit
rating is Hungary, which ranks at BBB- at the end of the sample. Nine countries experienced ratings
downgrades in the time covered by the sample, five of which occurred during the first half of 2009.
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Figure 1.1: CDS Spreads for Advanced Economies: 10Y Maturity mid in bps
analysis are listed in Table 1.2. Panel A lists the cumulative percentage of explained varia-
tion in CDS spread changes by the first five principal components. To assess the economic
significance of the explained variation, we also conduct a principal component analysis of
the weekly domestic stock market returns of the sovereigns, respectively.6
The first principal component alone explains 74% of sample variation, whereas the first
five principal components explain 94%. For domestic stock market returns the first principal
6As a proxy for local stock market performance, we utilize the Dow Jones Total Market Indices. These
are float-adjusted market capitalization weighted country-specific indices aiming to represent the domestic
common stock universe. Also included are securities with the characteristics of common equities, such
as REITs. Our empirical results are robust to using alternative country-specific indices. All indices are
USD-denominated.
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Table 1.2: Principal Components Analysis.
This table reports results of a principal components analysis of weekly CDS spread changes.
Panel A reports the cumulative percentage of explained variation in CDS spread changes as
well as of country-specific equity index returns. Panel B reports the results of a time-series
regression of the first principal component on several factors. Reported coefficients are stan-
dardized and t-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Significance at
the one-percent, five percent and ten-percent level is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively.
Panel A
PC Delta CDS Stock Returns
1 74.35% 66.05%
2 83.49% 71.63%
3 87.80% 76.64%
4 91.61% 80.77%
5 94.22% 84.06%
Panel B
(1) (2)
Stoxx 50 −0.46∗∗∗ −0.16
(−4.62) (−1.61)
Vix −0.04 −0.14
(−0.46) (−1.46)
High Yield 0.09∗∗ 0.08∗∗
(2.24) (2.15)
GSCI −0.11∗ −0.16∗∗
(−1.79) (−2.42)
Carry Trade −0.18∗∗∗ −0.10
(−2.73) (−1.48)
World Financials −0.47∗∗∗
(−3.53)
N 289 289
R2 (%) 38 44
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component explains 66% of sample variation, and the first five principal components explain
84%. Although both equity returns and spread changes exhibit a large degree of common-
ality, CDS spreads appear to display stronger cross-sectional correlation. This echoes the
results in Longstaff et al. (2009), who argue that diversification benefits for sovereign credit
portfolios are lower than for international equity portfolios.
To explore what economically meaningful factors might underlie such commonality, we
extract the first principal component and regress it on several factors commonly used in
credit risk modeling. The factors are the return of a European equity index, the Stoxx 50,
changes in the VIX index, changes in a European high yield index (BB European Corporates
- BBB European Corporates), the return to the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index, the
return to a carry trade portfolio and the return to an index measuring the performance of
financials in developed countries (MSCI Financials Index). Panel B in 1.1 shows the results.
The equity market factor and the carry trade factor are significantly negatively related
to the first principal component, such that a one standard deviation change in the Stoxx
50 leads to a negative 0.46 standard deviation change in the first principal component.
Contrary to the findings of Pan and Singleton (2008) and Longstaff et al. (2009), the VIX
appear to be unrelated to the first principal component. In specification (2), we add the
return of a world financials index to the regression. This inclusion adds to the explanatory
power of the regression showing a 6% increase in the R2 value. Furthermore, the coefficient
estimate is large and highly significant, and the world financials factor drives out entirely the
equity market factor – suggesting that the first principal component is strongly correlated
with the state of the world financial system, a finding that we explore further in the next
section.
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1.3 Empirical Analysis
The starting point for our empirical analysis is Longstaff et al. (2009), who specify a set
of factors that proxy for underlying sources of commonality in sovereign emerging market
CDS spreads.7 In particular, the proposed sources of co-movement affect the expected
recovery rates, the default probabilities and any risk premia associated with liquidity, and
thus impact the market pricing of these contracts. We adopt these factors for our empirical
analysis. However, since all of the countries in our sample are more advanced economies
and in geographical proximity to Europe, we construct the European equivalent factors.
1.3.1 Explanatory Variables
We sort the covariates into three groups - local, global, and risk premium variables.
Local Variables. We consider three local variables which capture the state of the domes-
tic macroeconomy: (i) the weekly return of the USD-denominated Dow Jones Total Market
country index, (ii) the weekly return of the exchange rate relative to the USD, (iii) the
weekly change in the USD-value of exchange rate reserves, in billions.8
Global Variables. We use four global variables to proxy for the state of the global
macroeconomy: (i) the weekly return of the USD-denominated Euro Stoxx 50 Index9, (ii)
the weekly percentage change in the yield to the 10 year German Bund, (iii) the weekly
change in the spread between BBB European Corporates and AA European Corporates
7For detailed explanations of the construction of the factors see Longstaff et al. (2009).
8The dollar value of exchange rate reserves is provided at a monthly frequency. We linearly interpolate
monthly observations to arrive at weekly data. As a robustness check, we also conduct our analysis using
only the monthly observations. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar.
9There are many other European market indices that could potentially be used in the analysis. The
reason we chose the Euro Stoxx 50 is twofold: First, it is a very visible European equity index. Second, it
is highly correlated with other cross-European indices such as the FTSE Eurotop 100 and the S&P Europe
350.
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(investment grade spread), (iv) the weekly change in the spread between BB European
Corporates and BBB European Corporates (high yield spread). Furthermore, we use two
variables to proxy for global investment flows (both series are in USD billions): (i) the
weekly change in total net inflows to long-term US equity mutual funds, (ii) the weekly
change in total net inflows to long-term US bond mutual funds.10
Risk Premium Variables. We use two variables to proxy for risk premia: (i) weekly
changes in the price to earnings ratio for the Euro Stoxx 50 (equity premium proxy), (ii)
weekly changes in the spread between the V2X volatility implied index (implied volatility
of the Euro Stoxx 50) and the weekly realized volatility as measured by the Garman and
Klass (1980) volatility estimator.
1.3.2 Preliminary Analysis
We now employ the above factors to analyze the time-series and cross-sectional dynamics
of observed sovereign CDS spreads.
1.3.2.1 Country by Country Regressions
To identify which of the covariates have explanatory power for CDS spread changes, we
specify a regression given by
∆CDSit = XTitβi + it, (1.1)
where Xit is the matrix of factor observations and βi is a vector of standardized regression
coefficients11. The coefficients are scaled by the ratio of the standard deviation of the
10These dataseries cover US mutual funds from the Investment Company Institute. Unfortunately, to our
knowledge there is no publicly available European equivalent. Nevertheless, we believe that these variables
are relevant proxies for global capital flows.
11Instead of the regression specified in Equation 1.1, we could also assess the significance of different
factors by regressing relative CDS spreads on relative factors, where the differences are taken with respect
to a base country. However, we specify the regressions in absolute terms so that the reported coefficients
are numeraire invariant.
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independent variable relative to the standard deviation of the dependent variable. Hence, a
regression coefficient of -0.5 implies that a one standard deviation move in the independent
variable results in a -0.5 standard deviation move in the dependent variable. Furthermore,
all independent variables are demeaned.
The results of the country-by-country regression in Equation 1.1 are displayed in Table
1.3. A casual inspection reveals that the commonality in CDS spreads apparent in Figure
1.1 does not appear to be captured by any of the covariates.
The market factor is only significant at the 5% level in 6 of the 16 countries in the
sample. No other covariate is significant in more than 6 countries, and many variables are
only significant in one or two countries. Confirming the results is Longstaff et al. (2009),
we also find that local factors generally perform poorly relative to their global counterparts.
The local market index is only significant at the 5% level in 4 of the countries and carries
considerably smaller loadings than the market factor in those cases. Furthermore, for most
countries, we find that the regression coefficients have a sign in line with economic intu-
ition. For the local and the global market factors, we expect negative coefficients since an
increase in local and global index returns may proxy for an improvement in the domestic
and international macroeconomic climate, thus reducing the sovereign credit risk and CDS
spread.
We find different results compared to Longstaff et al. (2009) and Pan and Singleton
(2008) for the volatility risk premium factor. Even though our sample covers an episode of
crisis and market turmoil, the volatility risk premium is statistically insignificant in all of
the countries in our sample, which also echoes the results found in the principal component
analysis in Table 1.2. To ensure that these results are not driven by mismeasurement of
realized volatility, or the definition of the V2X index, we repeat the analysis using weekly
changes in the CBOE VIX index as the volatility factor. This confirms our earlier results:
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changes in the VIX index are insignificant for all countries in the sample. Contrary to
popularly held belief, it appears that Wall Street’s ”fear gauge” was not the primary channel
explaining the considerable inflation in sovereign CDS spreads during the financial crisis.
1.3.2.2 Local and Global Financials
As seen in Section 1.2.3, the time series of the first principal component of CDS spread
changes is significantly correlated with the global performance of financial services firms.
Motivated by this, we include two new covariates in the regression setup: (i) the weekly
return of an index of domestic financial services firms and (ii) the weekly return of a global
index of financial services firms.
To capture the state of local financials, we use the Dow Jones Total Market (DJTM)
Financials index, a float adjusted market capitalization weighted sector index denominated
in USD and available for all countries in our sample. This index aims to represent the
investable universe of financial services firms in each country. As for the return to global
financials, we again use the MSCI World Financials index. However, returns to the MSCI
index tend to be strongly correlated with returns to the Euro Stoxx 50 index, potentially
leading to the issue of collinearity. While collinearity per se is not a problem in judging the
overall fit of the model, it interferes with our ability to sensibly interpret the coefficients.
Hence, we first orthogonalize the world financials return by regressing it on the market
return, and assume the sum of the estimated residual and intercept to be our return to
world financials. We let RWFt denote the orthogonalized return to world financials.
Similarly, we orthogonalize the return to domestic financial firms. We are interested in
creating a variable measuring the performance of local financial firms independent of market
returns and global financials returns. Hence, we regress returns of the local financials on
returns to the market index and returns to global financials. As before, we take the sum
of the estimated residuals and intercept to be our orthogonalized return to local financials,
17
denoted RLFt .
We modify the regression specification in Equation 1.1 such that
∆CDSit = XTitβi + γiR
WF
t + δiR
LF
it + it. (1.2)
The point estimates of γi, shown in Table 1.4, are highly significant and large in absolute
magnitudes in 10 of the 16 countries, suggesting that the performance of the world financial
system may be an important source of commonality in the dynamics of CDS spreads over
the sample.
Interestingly, the estimates of δi are significant in 4 countries, all of which also have
significant estimates for γi. In these countries, the performance of the local financial system
had an impact above and beyond the health of the global financial system. The fit of the
model also seems considerably improved relative to Equation 1.1: the minimum R2 is 34%
relative to 26% in Table 1.3 whereas the maximum R2 rises to 64% in the case of Ireland,
relative to 56% for Sweden before.
1.3.2.3 Panel Regressions
To further assess the significance of the financials factors, we construct a panel from the
country-by-country observations. Since trading in advanced economies sovereign CDS was
relatively sparse pre-2007, the pooled sample also allows us to conduct statistical tests that
differentiate between the pre and post crisis periods. Furthermore, a panel setup enables
us to concisely verify and extend the results from the country-by-country regressions. We
specify the country fixed-effects panel regression as
∆CDSit = XTitβ + γR
WF
t + δR
LF
it + αi + it. (1.3)
The first specification does not differentiate between pre and post crisis period. We then
interact RWFt and R
LF
it with an indicator function 1It>τ , which takes a value of 0 before the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (9/15/2008) and a value of 1 afterwards.
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Table 1.5: Effects of the Financial System on Sovereign CDS Spreads Pre/Post
Crisis Breakpoint.
Specification (1) reports the results of the fixed-effects panel regression ∆CDSit = XTitβ +
γRWFt + δR
LF
it + αi + it at a weekly frequency. Country fixed-effects are captured by αi.
Specification (2) interacts RWFt and R
LF
it with the indicator function 1It>τ , which takes
a value of 0 before the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (9/15/2008) and a value of 1
afterwards. Reported t-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity at the
country-level. Significance at the one-percent, five percent and ten-percent level is denoted
by ***, ** and * respectively.
(1) (2)
Local Index −40.25 −47.76
(−1.25) (−1.40)
FX 121.86∗∗∗ 124.63∗∗∗
(2.77) (2.86)
FX Reserves −1.07∗ −1.08∗
(−1.86) (−1.89)
Local Financials −39.21∗∗∗ 8.01
(−3.22) (0.39)
Dummy * Local Financials −50.84∗∗
(−2.34)
Stoxx 50 −84.77∗∗∗ −81.76∗∗∗
(−4.27) (−4.18)
World Financials −103.41∗∗∗ −62.49∗∗∗
(−5.61) (−3.41)
Dummy * World Financials −58.45∗∗
(−2.19)
10Y Bund Yield −31.84∗ −28.50∗
(−1.94) (−1.73)
IG Spread 10.40 10.09
(1.41) (1.34)
HY Spread 4.37 4.46
(1.31) (1.40)
Eq. Premium −0.49∗∗∗ −0.46∗∗∗
(−3.04) (−2.99)
Vol Premium −0.58 −1.14
(−0.08) (−0.15)
Eq. Flow 0.08∗∗ 0.09∗∗
(2.16) (2.22)
Bond Flow −0.03 −0.02
(−0.17) (−0.15)
Intercept 0.42 0.63
(1.16) (1.62)
Dummy −0.35
(−0.33)
N 1393 1393
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Although several observers may argue that the financial crisis began in 2007 with the
demise of Bear Stearns, we believe that only after the collapse of Lehman Brothers did the
pass-through effects of the market turmoil significantly affect sovereign credit risk. Indeed,
Figure 1.1 shows that most of the widening in spreads happened in the immediate aftermath
of Lehman’s bankruptcy. Hence, we choose 9/15/2008 as our pre-post crisis breakpoint12.
The estimates of specification (1) in Table 1.5 generally confirm our findings of the
country-by-country regressions.13 The return to local and global financials exhibit negative
coefficients significant at the 0.1% level. Furthermore, the coefficients are also economically
large: a one standard deviation increase in the return to the global financials, for example,
entails a 0.2 standard deviation decrease in the CDS spread. In terms of absolute magnitude,
this coefficient estimate is only second to the market factor, whose standardized loading is
0.27. Specification (2) accounts for pre and post crisis differences. As expected, much of the
covariation between financials and sovereign CDS spreads is an artefact of the post-Lehman
time period. In fact, the impact of the return to the local financial system is insignificant
pre-Lehman. Note that impact of world financials almost doubles in the aftermath of the
Lehman bankruptcy.
1.3.3 Private-to-Public Risk Transfer
Our results thus far indicate that the Lehman bankruptcy event and the ensuing government
interventions led market participants to price in a transfer of risk from private institutions
to the public sector, which considerably affected the dynamics of sovereign CDS market
prices, a channel that will now be explored in more depth.
12Our results are robust to changing the cut-off point within the two weeks encompassing the bankruptcy
of Lehman Brothers. Since the sovereign CDS market for advanced economies did not trade liquidly prior to
2007, breakpoints surrounding the demise of Bear Stearns suffer from an inadequate number of observations
pre-crisis.
13All return variables are expressed in decimal form. Hence, a 0.01 unit increase in a return-based regressor
corresponds to a 1% increase. The units of all other explanatory variables are outlined in Section .
21
1.3.3.1 Measuring Exposure to the Financial System
If sovereign credit risk embedded in CDS spreads truly covaries with the health of the
financial system, we expect this effect to be stronger in countries with higher exposure to the
financial system. Countries in which the financial sector plays a larger role may need to take
larger ownership stakes, extend more support programs and assume more bank liabilities
to stabilize their economy, thus increasing their credit risk. The channel through which a
sovereign’s default probability and expected recovery is affected can manifest in different
ways. Government support programs for ailing financial firms, for example, may require the
sovereign to issue more domestic or non-domestic debt, thus increasing the leverage ratio.
In the long run, the desire to monetize some of the domestic debt outstanding may also
stoke inflation, which could affect the sovereign’s ability to repay its external debt. Another
channel may be the implicit or explicit assumption of financial sector liabilities, thus creating
a private-to-public transfer of credit risk. Finally, a worsening domestic and global financial
sector may decrease economic growth and therefore affect a country’s fundamentals, making
it more difficult to service outstanding debt.
There exist several measures that may capture the exposure of a country to its financial
system. We focus on two measures, a stock-based measure and a flow-based measure, and
both are evaluated on a country basis.
The first metric, θi, proxying for the relative size of the financial system, is a ratio
of two market capitalizations. It is computed as the average (1/1/2003-6/1/2007) of the
ratio of the market capitalization of financial firms over total market capitalization for
each country. To compute the market capitalization of financial firms, we simply use the
market capitalization of the DJTM Financials Index. Similarly, to compute the total market
capitalization of each country, we use the DJTM Country index. As mentioned before, both
indices are value-weighted and float-adjusted. Hence, θi may not quantitatively equal the
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true size of the financial sector. However, robustness tests show that it correlates positively
with other, similar measures, such as the ratio of aggregate bank assets to GDP.
The second metric, ∆BAi, proxies for the growth in the financial sector pre-2007. It is
defined as the average percentage change in domestic bank assets (1/1/2003 - 12/31/2006).
This measure identifies countries for which the financial sector grew quicker in the years
leading up to the financial crisis. Hence, a high ∆BAi may indicate that banks may have
taken on additional risks for higher returns and accelerated growth. Such fast-growing
financial sectors could be particularly susceptible to collapse in the wake of financial turmoil,
thus prompting government bail-outs and increased sovereign CDS spread sensitivity.
Table 1.6: Measuring Exposure to the Financial Sector. This table reports the
results of sorting countries in the sample by two metrics: θi and ∆BAi. θi is computed
as the average (1/1/2003 - 6/1/2007) of the ratio of the market capitalization of financial
firms over total market capitalization for each country. ∆BAi is the average (1/1/2003 -
12/31/2006) annual growth rate in total bank assets for each country.
θi ∆BAi
Country Ratio Country Ratio
SLO 0.01 GER 0.02
FIN 0.05 POR 0.05
CZE 0.18 CZE 0.05
ISR 0.18 ITA 0.09
FRA 0.21 FRA 0.11
GER 0.24 DEN 0.11
DEN 0.26 SWE 0.12
UK 0.27 FIN 0.12
SWE 0.28 GRE 0.14
NET 0.38 UNI 0.15
SPA 0.41 NET 0.15
HUN 0.42 SPA 0.17
ITA 0.47 HUN 0.20
GRE 0.54 IRE 0.23
IRE 0.54 ISR N/A
POR 0.56 SLO N/A
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Table 1.6 reports the country ranking by θi and ∆BAi. Both metrics are positively
correlated, with a Spearman rank order correlation of 0.3214. Ireland and Hungary rank
in the top third using either metric. Anecdotally, this seems consistent with the pattern
observed during the crisis. Ireland, for example, nationalized Anglo Irish Bank in January
2009 after it was determined that a government recapitalization scheme would not be suf-
ficient to prevent the bank’s failure. Furthermore, the nation’s two largest banks, Allied
Irish Bank and Bank of Ireland, both received EUR3.5bn in government assistance.
1.3.3.2 Explaining CDS Spread Changes
Under the assumption that the two metrics discussed above, θi and ∆BAi, are reasonable
proxies for a sovereign’s exposure to its financial system, we formulate hypotheses about
how the private-to-public risk transfer differs across countries along this dimension. The
first hypothesis concerns the time-series dynamics of countries with high values of θi or
∆BAi relative to countries with low values.
Hypothesis 1. If a change in the condition of the financial system matters for the price
of sovereign CDS, then we expect this effect to be stronger in high θi (∆BAi) versus low θi
(∆BAi) countries.
To see whether this is indeed the case, we stratify the sample by θi.15 All 16 countries
are sorted by the magnitude of θi and ranked from 1 to 16. Each country is then placed in
one of two bins. The low-θ bin contains the bottom eight countries, whereas the high bin
contains the top eight. We then estimate the regression
∆CDSit = XTitβj + γjR
WF
t + δjR
LF
it + it (1.4)
14Portugal ranks highly on the θi measure but low on the ∆BAi measure. As a robustness check, we
exclude Portugal from the empirical analysis. The results are qualitatively similar in the specifications for
CDS spread changes as well as levels.
15We also conduct this analysis using ∆BAi to stratify the sample. The results are qualitatively similar.
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for each of the two bins j={low,high}. If Hypothesis 1 is correct, we expect that |γhigh|−
|γlow| > 0, |δhigh| − |δlow| > 0 and both differences are statistically significant.
The results of this regression are presented in Table 1.7 under the single sorts tab. The
loadings on world and local financials for the high-θ bin are larger in absolute magnitude
than the corresponding loadings for the low-θ bin. Furthermore, the difference |γhigh|−|γlow|
is statistically significant at the 1% level, whereas the difference |δhigh|− |δlow| is significant
at the 5% level. This finding suggests that countries with a large exposure to the domestic
financial sector pre-crisis were indeed more strongly affected by the health of the global and
local financial system. In particular, credit risk the for low-θ countries was not significantly
affected by the health of the local financial system. However, market participants appeared
to be concerned about the systemic risk posed by a deterioration in the world financial
sector. This is evidenced by the statistically significant point estimate for δlow. In high-θ
countries, however, CDS spreads co-vary strongly with both the idiosyncratic and systematic
risk of the financial sector. In such countries, market participants priced in increased credit
risk due to local financial distress as well as the negative feedback effects of a world financial
crisis. The double sorts tab in Table 1.7 will be discussed below in the context of country
heterogeneity.
So far we have tested the risk transfer in a time-series setting, but we should also expect
this effect to be present in a cross-sectional test. Furthermore, a cross-sectional analysis can
shed light on the economic significance of any effects imparted by changes in the condition
of the financial system. To that end we specify a cross-sectional panel regression model
with time fixed effects. Since we are interested in empirical regularities across countries,
we include as explanatory variables the subset of factors that are country-specific: (i) the
weekly percentage return of the USD-denominated Dow Jones Total Market country index,
(ii) the weekly percentage return of the exchange rate relative to the USD, (iii) the weekly
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Table 1.7: Sovereign CDS Spread Sensitivities sorted by θi. This table reports
regression results of sorting countries by different cross-sectional attributes. For each bin,
the regression specification is given by ∆CDSit = XTitβi + γiR
WF
t + δiR
LF
it + it. The single
sort refers to a country sort according to θi. In the double sort countries are first sorted
according to their membership in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
and then by their ranking of θi. Reported coefficients are standardized and t-statistics
(in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Significance at the one-percent, five
percent and ten-percent level is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively.
Single Sort Double Sort
Non-EMU EMU
Low θi High θi Low θi High θi Low θi High θi
Local Index -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.20 -0.09 0.07*
(-0.98) (-0.99) (-0.85) (-1.43) (-1.42) (1.80)
FX 0.04 0.24*** 0.03 0.09 0.16 0.34***
(0.52) (3.09) (0.43) (0.84) (1.54) (6.28)
FX Reserves -0.10** -0.10 -0.18** -0.13 -0.03 -0.03
(-2.29) (-1.25) (-2.52) (-1.09) (-0.84) (-1.45)
Local Financials -0.09 -0.15*** -0.10 -0.04 -0.05 -0.28***
(-1.30) (-3.12) (-1.04) (-0.33) (-0.87) (-4.47)
Stoxx 50 -0.37*** -0.21*** -0.51*** -0.37*** -0.18 -0.11
(-3.87) (-2.79) (-5.22) (-3.45) (-1.32) (-1.50)
World Financials -0.14*** -0.21*** -0.10** -0.15** -0.23*** -0.30***
(-3.80) (-5.01) (-2.04) (-2.36) (-3.48) (-6.11)
10Y Bund -0.05 -0.10** 0.00 -0.01 -0.08 -0.19***
(-0.86) (-2.00) (0.00) (-0.21) (-0.79) (-2.64)
IG Spread 0.06 0.04 -0.02 0.05 0.16** 0.03
(1.41) (0.86) (-0.32) (0.73) (2.47) (0.74)
HY Spread 0.06 0.02 0.11** 0.03 0.02 0.04
(1.33) (0.74) (2.08) (0.58) (0.28) (1.29)
P/E Ratio -0.06* -0.05*** -0.06 -0.02 -0.07* -0.08***
(-1.88) (-2.76) (-1.37) (-0.58) (-1.77) (-3.70)
Vol. Premium -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.01
(-0.14) (0.01) (-0.39) (-0.11) (-0.35) (0.17)
Equity Flow 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.04
(1.43) (1.41) (0.97) (0.87) (1.01) (1.29)
Bond Flow 0.01 -0.02 0.09 0.04 0.04 -0.04
(0.10) (-0.34) (0.76) (0.27) (0.41) (-1.21)
N 585 808 277 305 307 504
R2 0.28 0.37 0.42 0.39 0.28 0.48
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change in the USD-value of exchange rate reserves and (iv) the weekly percentage return
to the domestic orthogonalized Dow Jones Total Market Financials index.
If it is true that countries with a higher exposure to the financial system, as measured
by θi (∆BAi), exhibit a higher CDS spread sensitivity towards the performance of finan-
cials, then we can identify this effect by interacting the local financials return, RLFit , with
θi (∆BAi) whilst controlling for RLFit and θi (∆BAi) separately. Hence, we specify the
regression model
∆CDSit = XTitβ + γzi + δR
LF
it + ρziR
LF
it + νt + it, (1.5)
where zi stand for either θi or ∆BAi, and νt denotes a time fixed-effect. If Hypothesis 1 is
correct, we expect ρ to be negative and statistically significant, so that a change in RLFit is
augmented for countries with large zi.
Table 1.8 reports the estimation results for Equation 1.5, with zi = θi in specification (1)
and zi = ∆BAi in specification (2). The coefficient estimates have the same sign for both
specifications, reinforcing the conjecture that both θi and ∆BAi measure similar underlying
economic mechanisms. In both specifications, ρ is statistically significant and negative.16
Furthermore, the local index return, the local exchange rate return and the change in local
foreign exchange reserves all significantly co-move with changes in the sovereign CDS spread.
The signs of the coefficients on these three factors are consistent with economic intuition
and previous work. A deterioration in domestic economic conditions captured by a decrease
in the local stock market results in an increase in the price of credit protection. Similarly,
an increase in the price of USD expressed in terms of the domestic currency (equivalently,
a devaluation in the domestic exchange rate) leads to an increase in the sovereign CDS
16The magnitude of the point estimate, however, differs markedly. To a large extent, this is driven by
the degree of collinearity between ∆BAi and R
LF
it . Countries growing their financial system at a faster rate
also experience stronger fluctuations in the return to local financials. This correlation leads to a positive
estimate of δ in specification (2), which somewhat offsets the effect of ρ.
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Table 1.8: Cross-sectional Regression. This table reports the results of a cross-sectional
panel regression of the form ∆CDSit = XTitβ + γzi + δR
LF
it + ρziR
LF
it + νt + it. zi stands
for either θi (Specification 1) or ∆BAi (Specification 2). Time fixed-effects are captured by
νt. Reported coefficients are in basis points and t-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted
for heteroskedasticity. Significance at the one-percent, five percent and ten-percent level is
denoted by ***, ** and * respectively.
(1) (2)
Local Index −82.67∗∗∗ −89.51∗∗∗
(−4.11) (−4.29)
FX 188.25∗∗∗ 238.46∗∗∗
(4.33) (4.94)
FX Reserves −1.12∗∗∗ −0.98∗∗∗
(−3.62) (−3.08)
Local Financials 31.57 60.03∗∗
(1.39) (2.52)
θ −0.08
(−0.03)
Local Financials * θ −103.08∗∗
(−2.20)
∆BA 5.80
(0.71)
Local Financials * ∆BA −410.56∗∗∗
(−3.55)
Intercept 0.61 −0.06
(0.60) (−0.06)
N 1006 912
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes
28
spread. Lastly, an increase in domestic foreign exchange reserves, which may capture a
stabilizing economy and exchange rate, leads to a decrease in the CDS spread.
The estimate for ρ suggests that a negative shock to the local financial system translates
into an increase in spreads, and that the magnitude of the effect is larger for countries with
a higher level of θ. This is also economically significant. A one standard deviation change
to the return to the domestic financial system leads to a 4bps reduction in the CDS spread,
holding θ fixed at unity.17 In the case of Portugal, for example, a one standard deviation
shock to local financials leads to a 2.1bps increase in the sovereign credit swap spread. The
magnitude of this effect equates to roughly 5% of Portugal’s average CDS spread level over
the sample.
1.3.3.3 EMU Member Countries
Our second hypothesis concerns the differential effect of the global and local financial sys-
tem on sovereign CDS spreads for countries in the Economic and Monetary Union of the
European Union. Out of the 16 countries in our sample, 10 are EMU members. Hence,
these countries share the euro as a common currency.18 Monetary policy in Eurozone coun-
tries is defined and implemented by the European Central Bank (ECB). Crucially, the ECB
has the exclusive authority to authorize the issuance of euro bank notes. Hence, eurozone
countries cannot monetize any euro-denominated outstanding debt by printing domestic
currency. Inflexibility in monetary policy and the inability to print domestic currency may
affect a country’s default probability, thus increasing its credit risk. For this reason we
believe that during the recent financial crisis, eurozone CDS spreads may have exhibited
17The standard deviation refers to the standard deviation of the return to local financials if all observations
are pooled.
18At the beginning of our sample in 2003, Slovenia had not joined the third stage of the EMU yet. It
introduced the Euro as its currency on January 1st 2007. Our empirical analysis treats Slovenia as an EMU
member throughout the sample. However, this assumption is relatively innocuous because there are very
few observations for Slovenia CDS spreads prior to 2007.
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more sensitivity to the health of financial system than their non-eurozone counterparts.
Hypothesis 2. If a change in the condition of the financial system matters for the price of
sovereign CDS, then we expect this effect to be stronger for EMU-countries versus Non-EMU
countries.
To test this hypothesis, we stratify the sample by EMU and non-EMU countries as
well as by sovereigns’ levels of θi, leading to four bins. The two non-eurozone bins contain
three countries each, whereas the eurozone bins contain five countries each. As before, we
estimate Equation 1.4, where j designates the bin and j={Non-EMU & low θ), Non-EMU
& high θ, EMU & low θ, EMU & high θ}.
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 1.7 under the double sorts tab. The
estimated factor loadings γj are statistically significant and monotonically increasing for
each bin. This suggests that even though credit risk in all countries in the sample was
affected by the systematic risk posed by a collapse of the financial system, countries in the
eurozone where more susceptible to this effect than non-eurozone countries. A test of the
null hypothesis that the estimates of γj are equal for the two extreme bins, Non-EMU &
low θ and EMU & high θ is rejected with 5% confidence. Eurozone countries in which the
economy was more exposed to a deterioration of the financial system pre-crisis exhibit a
significantly stronger sensitivity to the world financials factor.
In fact, the loading on the EMU & high θ bin is almost three times as large as the loading
on the Non-EMU & low θ bin. Furthermore, the coefficient estimates are also economically
significant. For eurozone countries with high levels of θ, a one standard deviation change
in the return to global financials leads to a 0.3 standard deviation change in the level of
the sovereign CDS spread. The point estimates for δj reveal a similar story. In fact, they
are statistically insignificant for all but the EMU & high θ bin. However, for this bin, the
factor loading is economically large and significant at the 1% level, corroborating the above
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results.
1.3.3.4 Exposure to Subprime Securities
Our third hypothesis addresses the common perception that subprime securities played a
key role in the financial crisis. Securities backed with subprime mortgages were widely held
by financial institutions and, as a result of increased default rates and delinquencies, lost
a majority of their value during the financial crisis. If governments explicitly or implicitly
assumed financial sector liabilities during this period, we might expect that a country’s
CDS spread sensitivity towards the financial system is larger if domestic banks were heavily
invested in the subprime sector. This forms the basis for our third hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. If a change in the condition of the financial system matters for the price of
sovereign CDS, then we expect this effect to be stronger for countries with higher exposures
to the subprime mortgage sector.
In order to compute a country’s exposure to the subprime mortgage sector, we obtain
a time series of the ABX.HE index. This index tracks the price of CDSs on a set of 20
equal-weighted, AAA-rated US subprime mortgage-backed securities issued within 6 month
of each other. The first index launched in January 2006, with new on-the-run indices
being introduced every six months, each time referencing 20 new subprime mortgage-backed
securities. When an index starts trading, it is marked at a nominal value of 100. The up-
front payment required to insure the underlying securities is then given by 100 minus the
value of the index, taken as a percentage of the notional. Additionally, there exists a fixed
annual payment, also expressed as a percentage of the notional. This quoting convention
is standard in up-front CDS markets. Suppose, for the sake of example, that an investor
would like to insure $10m of underlying mortgage-backed securities. If the index trades at
70, this equates to an up-front payment of $3m (30% of the $10m notional). Hence the value
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of the index correlates inversely with the default likelihood of the underlying securities.
If a country’s financial sector was heavily exposed to subprime securities, then the return
to domestic financials should co-move with the performance of the ABX.HE index, assuming
that the index is a good proxy.19 Hence, for each country, we regress RLFit on the percentage
return to the ABX.HE index. We then rank countries by the absolute magnitude of the
standardized coefficient. If hypothesis 3 is correct, we should expect that countries in the
high subprime exposure bin exhibit a stronger co-movement with local and global financials
than countries in the low bin.
The first two columns in Table 1.9 refer to a single sort based on the absolute magnitude
of the coefficient. Interestingly, both the low and high subprime exposure bins have similar
loadings on the world financials return. Hence, whether or not a country’s financial market
was significantly exposed to the subprime mortgage market made little difference to the
time-series properties of sovereign CDS spreads. Although market participants accounted
for the systemic risk posed by the global financial sector, the degree of co-movement did
not differ based on countries’ subprime exposures. In fact, a test for γlow = γhigh cannot be
rejected at conventional significance levels.
Focusing on the coefficient estimate for δi, it is apparent that the effect of the local
financial sector on sovereign CDS spreads also does not conform to hypothesis 3. Again, a
test for δlow = δhigh reveals that there is no statistically significant difference in coefficient
estimates. The double sort based on subprime exposure and the level of θ confirms this
result. While factor sensitivities for local and global financials generally increase in the
absolute magnitude of θ, they do not differ depending on the degree of subprime exposure.
19Conversations with CDS and MBS traders anecdotally confirmed that the ABX.HE index is the most
watched index in the subprime mortgage segment.
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Table 1.9: Sovereign CDS Spread Sensitivities sorted by Exposure to Subprime
Securities. This table reports regression results of double-sorting countries by their expo-
sure to the subprime mortgage sector and θi. For each bin, the regression specification is
given by ∆CDSit = XTitβi + γiR
WF
t + δiR
LF
it + it. Countries’ exposure to sub-prime is de-
termined by the magnitude of the coefficient in a regression of local financials returns on re-
turns to the ABX.HE (AAA) index. Reported coefficients are standardized and t-statistics
(in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Significance at the one-percent, five
percent and ten-percent level is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively.
Single Sort Double Sort
Low Exp. High Exp. Low Exp. High Exp.
Low θi High θi Low θi High θi
Local Index 0.04 -0.20** -0.11 0.18*** -0.06 -0.11
(0.92) (-2.00) (-1.21) (2.91) (-0.58) (-0.70)
FX 0.16** 0.17** 0.14 0.16* 0.04 0.24**
(2.51) (2.32) (1.25) (1.88) (0.36) (2.34)
FX Reserves -0.04** -0.12* -0.06 -0.02 -0.10 -0.14
(-2.08) (-1.84) (-1.50) (-0.84) (-1.46) (-1.40)
Local Financials -0.25*** -0.01 -0.12 -0.32*** 0.05 -0.12
(-4.33) (-0.13) (-1.21) (-4.35) (0.54) (-0.82)
Stoxx50 -0.26*** -0.28*** -0.33*** -0.22** -0.39*** -0.24**
(-3.12) (-3.65) (-2.63) (-2.10) (-3.00) (-2.35)
World Financials -0.18*** -0.19*** -0.15** -0.24*** -0.13*** -0.22***
(-3.93) (-4.57) (-2.34) (-3.73) (-2.61) (-4.25)
10Y Bund -0.11 -0.06 -0.00 -0.21* -0.05 -0.08*
(-1.53) (-1.45) (-0.02) (-1.94) (-0.63) (-1.77)
IG Spread 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.04
(0.91) (0.89) (1.11) (0.28) (0.36) (0.81)
HY Spread 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.01
(1.54) (0.47) (1.12) (1.29) (0.58) (0.35)
Eq. Premium -0.06** -0.05** -0.08 -0.05* -0.05 -0.06**
(-2.26) (-2.32) (-1.52) (-1.81) (-1.49) (-2.43)
Vol Premium -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01
(-0.20) (0.30) (-0.35) (0.21) (0.40) (0.17)
Eq. Flow 0.07* 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.04
(1.66) (1.09) (1.32) (0.32) (0.80) (0.97)
Bond Flow -0.05 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.00
(-1.07) (0.17) (-0.57) (-0.41) (0.26) (0.01)
N 514 879 256 258 324 555
R2 0.37 0.34 0.33 0.44 0.26 0.41
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1.3.3.5 Explaining CDS Spread Levels
Up to this point, our analysis has focused on CDS spread changes, rather than levels.
However, if a country’s exposure to the financial sector affects its default intensity process,
it should also affect the level of the sovereign CDS spread. To control for factors other than
the financials exposure, we rely on structural models of default, such as Merton (1974),
to furnish a set of control variables.20 Ericcson, Jacobs and Oviedo (2009) show that
leverage and asset volatility, two important theoretical determinants of credit risk, are also
empirically correlated with the level of corporate CDS spreads. Hence, we compute the
sovereign analogues to leverage and asset volatility using the quarterly time series of total
debt outstanding over Gross Domestic Product and the 90 day rolling window volatilities
of the domestic equity market. To control for the size of the country, as well as whether
it is a member of the EMU, we utilize the USD level of total equity market capitalization
and an EMU dummy. Using the set of covariates outlined above as control variables, we
are now in a position to formulate and test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. If a change in the condition of the financial system matters for the price of
sovereign CDS, then we expect the level of the CDS spread to be higher for high-θ (∆BA)
versus low-θ (∆BA) countries.
To test this, we specify a cross-sectional panel regression with time fixed effects given
by
CDSit = XTitβ + γzi + νt + it. (1.6)
In this specification, zi stands for either θi or ∆BAi, and time fixed-effects are captured by
νt. If hypothesis 4 is correct, then we should expect a positive and statistically significant γ
20To simplify the analysis, we abstract away from the distinction between a sovereign’s ability and willing-
ness to pay, as in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), as well as the post-default debtor-creditor bargaining game,
as in Bulow and Rogoff (1989).
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coefficient estimate. Furthermore, to investigate whether the private-to-public risk transfer
was truly a new phenomenon during the financial crisis, we estimate Equation 1.6 before
and after our breakpoint, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.
Table 1.10: Sovereign CDS Spread Levels. This table reports results from a cross-
sectional panel regression of CDS spread levels on explanatory variables. The regression
specification is given by CDSit = XTitβ + γθi + δ∆BAi + νt + it. Time fixed-effects are
captured by νt. Specification (1) omits ∆BAi, (2) omits θi and (3) includes both variables.
Pre and Post refers to pre-crisis and post-crisis. The breakpoint is defined by the bankruptcy
of Lehman Brothers (9/15/2008). Reported coefficients are standardized and t-statistics (in
parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Significance at the one-percent, five percent
and ten-percent level is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
EMU Dummy -30.67*** -47.51*** -30.86*** -73.59*** -31.46*** -69.59***
(-7.87) (-7.55) (-8.15) (-13.37) (-8.21) (-12.77)
Local MktCap -12.00*** -40.10*** -14.66*** -52.79*** -13.01*** -40.19***
(-4.49) (-7.66) (-6.23) (-11.95) (-4.56) (-8.08)
Debt/GDP 41.36*** 47.13*** 53.01*** 159.42*** 48.92*** 115.19***
(5.44) (3.52) (8.28) (16.40) (6.48) (8.98)
Volatility 137.66*** 438.45*** 23.86 259.30*** 50.64 332.58***
(3.06) (13.34) (0.51) (7.72) (0.94) (9.27)
θ 37.92*** 124.45*** 17.57 106.11***
(2.85) (6.66) (1.02) (5.15)
∆BA 145.25*** 653.48*** 125.18*** 503.72***
(5.26) (15.46) (3.69) (9.96)
Intercept -12.71 -118.33*** 5.87 -114.45*** -2.73 -150.68***
(-0.88) (-6.49) (0.43) (-6.82) (-0.17) (-8.43)
N 240 708 235 671 235 671
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The point estimates of γ shown in Table 1.10 for specification (1) and (2) suggest that
both θi and ∆BAi are important factors in determining the level of sovereign CDS spreads.
The estimates of γ are economically large compared to the control variables. In specification
(1), for example, a sovereign’s debt to GDP ratio accounts for roughly 26bps of CDS spread
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level post-crisis, whereas θi accounts for roughly 39bps (using the cross-sectional average of
the debt to GDP ratio and θi). As expected, the effect of θi is significantly weaker pre-crisis,
around one third the post-crisis magnitude.
Interestingly, the EMU dummy has a large and negative effect on the level of sovereign
CDS spreads across all specifications. This finding suggests that countries in the EMU
were generally seen as less likely to default and hence traded at lower spread levels. To
some extent, this is associated with EMU countries having better average credit ratings in
our sample. Additionally, market participants may have implicitly assumed that countries
in the EMU will provide mutual support and hence are unlikely to default unilaterally.
Furthermore, the large difference in the coefficient magnitude pre and post crisis suggests
that the status of EMU membership was particulary relevant during the financial crisis.
1.4 Conclusion
Our results document a private to public risk transfer related to countries’ exposures to the
financial system during the recent financial crisis. This economic channel led to significant
co-movement between the price of insurance against default and the performance of the
financial sector, both locally and globally. We show the pattern differs across countries
operating under different monetary authorities. Although the level of CDS spreads is lower
for countries in the EMU, their sensitivities to the health of the financial system are higher
compared to non-EMU members.
For future research, it might also be useful to analyze a public to public risk transfer in
addition to the private to public risk transfer. In light of the recent debt crisis surrounding
Greece and other European Economies, several countries are considering extending signifi-
cant aid packages. This fiscal insurance mechanism might also be reflected in sovereign CDS
market prices. Not only could this shed further light on the default barrier of advanced
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economies, but it would also allow for the quantification of the wealth transfer among
nations embedded in government guarantees.
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Chapter 2
Do Macro-Economic Fundamentals
Price Emerging Market Sovereign
CDS Spreads?
2.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis and ensuing recession has brought into sharp focus the issue of
sovereign credit risk in emerging economies. As a result of the market turmoil and the spill-
over effects to the real economy, emerging sovereigns worldwide realized unprecedented
increases in the price of insurance against government default as measured by sovereign
credit default swap (CDS) spreads. Heavily dependent on international trade and foreign
capital, emerging economies were particularly vulnerable to deteriorating market conditions
during the financial crisis. Hungary’s 5 year CDS spread, for example, averaged 30bps
from January 2001 to December 2007. From January 2008 to April 2010, however, the
average spread realized an almost nine-fold gain to 261bps. In light of the significant
increase in sovereign credit risk for emerging markets, there is renewed interest in the macro-
economic determinants of sovereign CDS spreads. Empirically, country fundamentals play
an important role in explaining sovereign credit spreads. Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010), for
example, find that the change and volatility of a country’s terms of trade have economically
and statistically significant effects on the cost of sovereign borrowing. In this paper, I
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present and implement a pricing model for emerging market sovereign credit risk based
primarily on macro-economic fundamentals.
The existing literature on the pricing and management of sovereign credit risk generally
distinguishes between two broad approaches: structural and reduced-form. The structural
approach to credit risk was pioneered by Merton (1974). In these types of models, the
probability of default is determined by the distance between an issuer’s assets relative to its
liabilities.1 The threshold level of assets at which default occurs is either given exogenously
or derived endogenously as the outcome of the issuer’s optimization problem. In reduced
form models, on the other hand, the default event is not directly related to an issuer’s
solvency position. Rather, the default time is assumed to follow a stochastic hazard rate
process governed by latent state variables (see Duffie and Singleton (2003)).
In this paper, I use a structural model based on macro-economic fundamentals to price
sovereign CDS spreads. The application of this type of model to sovereign credit risk,
however, is not straight forward. Whilst a firm’s asset value can be reasonably ascertained
using balance sheet data and market prices of traded securities, it is difficult to define and
estimate the country-level equivalent.
Kulatilaka and Marcus (1987), for example, assume that GDP follows a stochastic pro-
cess which determines a country’s foreign debt capacity. As the sovereign levers up, the
increasing amount of debt service induces a drag on GDP growth. Default occurs when
the present value of consumption under default exceeds the present value of continuing the
debt service. In Claessens and Pennacchi (1996), repayment capacity is summarized by a
latent stochastic repayment process. Upon the first time this process hits zero, the country
1In Merton (1974), for example, the market value of debt is equal to the value of a simply contingent
claim, a short put option, which can be valued in a Black-Scholes (1973) framework. Extensions of the
Merton (1974) model have relaxed the default timing assumption (e.g. Black and Cox (1976)), allowed for
an endogenous default decision (e.g. Leland (1994)) and relaxed the assumption on the continuity of the
underlying stochastic process (e.g. Zhou (2001)).
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defaults. The parameters governing the dynamics of this process are then calibrated using
data on Mexican Brady Bonds. In Jeanneret (2009), the ‘asset value’ of the sovereign is
given by the present value of future revenues, which is approximated by the value of the
stock market index. Countries are trading off limited access to international markets post
default against the cost of debt servicing.
This paper proposes, and empirically implements, a model of sovereign default risk on
external debt based on observed exports, imports and international reserves. Using these
country-specific macro-fundamentals, I define a country’s ability to pay as the maximum
amount of foreign currency available for repayment of external debt. The ability to pay
is increasing in the present value of future exports as well as the current period foreign
exchange reserves, and decreasing in the present value of future imports. This definition
of sovereign foreign-currency solvency is closely related to a country’s unobservable ‘asset
value’, given by the present value of future revenues, in Jeanneret (2009). The joint dynam-
ics of the ability to pay, its volatility and the level of outstanding external debt determine
the level of country default risk and thus the sovereign CDS spread. The model is empir-
ically tractable and implemented for a sample of 6 emerging economies (Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Turkey) for a period covering the recent financial crisis.
A calibrated version of the model captures the widening of sovereign spreads during the
crisis and provides a good fit for the time-series dynamics of CDS spreads. For the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland, the average absolute model pricing errors are below 31bps.
Furthermore, the correlation between model-implied and market CDS spreads is positive
for all countries, and above 65% for five of them. Lastly, I use the model to measure the
market-implied level of country liabilities. On average, the value of implied external debt
is 13% larger than the reported level of debt.
The paper most closely related to this project is Karmann and Maltritz (2004). In
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Karmann and Maltritz (2004), the ability to pay consists of the sum of the present value
of net exports and foreign exchange reserves. This paper considers a more general setting
in which a sovereign’s foreign currency solvency can depend asymmetrically on its future
exports and imports, as well as reserves. Furthermore, I do not rely on market bond yield
data to compute the present value of exports and imports, but rather employ am asset
spanning approach. Lastly, I allow the default threshold to be a function of the face value
of debt as well as interest rates.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the struc-
tural model and discusses the pricing of sovereign credit risk in this setup. The model is
implemented for a set of 6 emerging economies in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 A Structural Model of Sovereign Credit Risk
In this section, I describe a structural model of credit risk for emerging economies. Through-
out, I assume that capital markets are frictionless and there are no information asymmetries.
I develop this model from the viewpoint of a US investor and hence measure all variables
in the model in $US.2
Lastly, I assume that the sovereign finances itself exclusively with zero-coupon foreign
debt. The face value of outstanding foreign debt is denoted by k¯. The sovereign continuously
rolls over existing debt, so that the maturity of outstanding debt is equal to T years at every
point in time.
2.2.1 Ability to Pay
Given the assumptions above on sovereign debt structure it is clear that the repayment of
outstanding liabilities is contingent on the sovereign’s access to international capital. In
2This is without loss of generality. The model only requires that all variables are measured in a non-
domestic currency.
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times of economic distress, servicing existing debt crucially depends on the ability to raise
foreign currency. In this model, I assume that a country can access foreign currency in two
ways: through its international reserves and through international trade.
A sovereign can tap its current period international reserves to repay outstanding debt.
Such reserves are generally regarded as an important indicator of the short-term financial
health of a country and often used as an input in the determination of credit ratings.
International reserves consist of assets held in reserve currencies, gold, SDRs and IMF
reserve positions - all of which can be easily liquidated and used towards the repayment of
debt.
For many emerging economies, exports constitute a large portion of GDP and generate
significant foreign currency receipts which can be used to service outstanding liabilities. In
the event of distress, I assume that a sovereign can raise foreign capital by collateralizing
future exports and imports. While future exports generate inflows of foreign currency, fu-
ture imports generate outflows. Using this line of reasoning, Karmann and Maltritz (2004)
define the maximum amount of foreign currency a sovereign can raise at any given time as
the difference between the present value of future exports and the present value of future
imports. However, in this paper I assume a more general formulation, allowing for an asym-
metric effect of future imports. In particular, I assume that in times of distress, a sovereign
can commit to forgoing forever a constant fraction of imports, denoted 1− ξ. This fraction
can be interpreted as an implementation of a fiscal austerity plan for a country in distress,
whereby the sovereign reduces its current and future imports to accumulate additional re-
serves towards the repayment of debt. The remaining fraction ξ represents the portion of
imports that is implicitly tied to exports (e.g. raw materials and intermediate goods) and
hence cannot be forfeited. Thus, the difference between the present value of exports and ξ
times the present value of imports acts as a collateral constraint, denoting the maximum
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amount of foreign currency a sovereign may borrow from supranational institutions or other
sovereigns in times of distress.
Following the preceding discussion, I define a sovereign’s ability to pay, Vt, as the maxi-
mum amount of foreign currency available for repayment of external debt. Let international
reserves, exports and imports be denoted by FXt, xt and it respectively. The ability to
pay is pinned down by the sum of current period reserves and the present value of future
exports minus the ξ-adjusted present value of future imports. Hence,
Vt = FXt + x∗t − ξi∗t (2.1)
where x∗t denotes the present value of future exports and i∗t denotes the present value of
future imports:
x∗t = Et
[ ∞∑
s=0
mx,t+sxt+s
]
, (2.2)
i∗t = Et
[ ∞∑
s=0
mi,t+sit+s
]
. (2.3)
Here mx,t+s and mi,t+s denote the appropriate discount factors for future imports and ex-
ports. The determination of these discount factors, as well as the empirical implementation
of Equations 2.2 and 2.3, is discussed in detail in Section 2.3.
2.2.2 Vt - Dynamics and the Default Threshold
As is customary in structural credit risk models, I assume that the bond issuer defaults when
its asset value falls sufficiently low relatively to its liabilities. The asset value of the sovereign
is given by its ability to pay, Vt. I denote the default trigger as νt. Computing sovereign
default probabilities and thus sovereign CDS spreads requires that we make assumptions
on the probabilistic dynamics of Vt and νt.
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2.2.2.1 Ability to Pay Process
Following Lehrbass (1999) and others, I assume that the dynamics of Vt are governed by a
geometric Brownian motion:
dVt
Vt
= rdt+ σdwQ, (2.4)
where w denotes a standard Brownian motion under the risk neutral probability measure
associated with the riskless money market account. The instantaneous riskless interest rate
r and the volatility σ is assumed to be constant.
2.2.2.2 Default Threshold
Define B(t, T ) = e−r(T−t) as the time t value of a default-free zero-coupon bond with
maturity T. Following Black and Cox (1976), the default threshold ν(t) is given by the
present value of the face value of debt:
νt = k¯B(t, T ). (2.5)
Hence, the sovereign defaults whenever the present value of its outstanding debt obligations
falls below its current repayment capacity. As such, νt can be interpreted as a safety
covenant enforced by sovereign bondholders - lenders force the sovereign into restructuring
as soon as Vt hits νt. We can now formally define the sovereign’s random time of default τ
as
τ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Vt ≤ νt}. (2.6)
It is important to note at this point that the model only captures default due to the
sovereign’s inability to pay. Clearly, a sovereign’s (un)willingness to pay could also trigger
a default event, as in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). Ecuador, for example, defaulted on
a $30.6mm interest payment in December 2008 despite international reserves in excess of
$5.5bn and a debt service to GDP ratio of less than 1%. However, willingness to pay is
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generally difficult to quantify and an extension of the model along these lines is left for
future research.
2.2.3 Survival Probabilities
Using the setup discussed above, we can now compute the sovereign default probabilities as
the first time the Vt process hits νt. In this model, default (and survival) probabilities are
given in closed form under the Q probability measure (e.g. Black and Cox (1976)). Let Q(s)
denote the risk neutral survival probability from time zero through time s ≤ T , conditional
on the sovereign not yet having defaulted. More formally, Q(s) = PQ{τ ≥ s|τ > 0}. Under
the dynamics for Vt and νt outlined above, we have that
Q(s) = N
(
γ − 12φ√
φ
)
− eγN
(
−γ − 12φ√
φ
)
, (2.7)
where γ and φ are given by
γ = ln
(
V0
ν0
)
, (2.8)
φ = sσ2. (2.9)
It is straightforward to check that Q(s) is increasing in γ. This is intuitive since γ
represents the log inverse leverage ratio of the sovereign: higher γ implies a larger distance
between a sovereign’s ability to pay and the default threshold. Furthermore, Q(s) is strictly
decreasing in s, so that a longer time horizon makes default more likely. Indeed, we have
that Q(s) → 0 as s → ∞. As expected, an increase in the volatility of Vt decreases the
survival probability, other things equal.
2.2.4 Sovereign CDS Valuation
The model outlined above allows us to compute the sovereign’s survival probabilities at
each point in time for any given horizon s ≤ T . Hence, we can use the model to value
credit-sensitive contingent claims, such as CDSs. Denote the time to maturity of a CDS
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contract as TN , where N specifies the number of coupon payment periods. Let the number
of payment periods N be indexed by j = 1, ..., N . Furthermore, let h denote the length of
each payment period, expressed in units of years. Thus, a j-period CDS has a maturity
of Tj = hj years. In the sovereign CDS market, the coupon frequency is usually semi-
annual, so that h = 0.5. The coupon paid by the protection buyer is quoted as a percentage
CDSTN of the insured notional, quoted on an annualized basis. CDSTN is know as the
CDS spread. For the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality, I will assume that the
underlying notional is equal to 1. Hence, conditional on the reference entity not defaulting,
the protection buyer pays a coupon hCDSTN at the end of each payment period. The CDS
spread varies across maturities TN , constituting a term structure of spreads.
In the event of default, the expected payment due to the holder of a credit swap is
given by a fraction 1−R of the notional amount insured, where R denotes the constant risk
neutral recovery rate on the underlying bond. Generally, R < 1, so that there is a loss for
bondholders in default. In the case of a sovereign default, we can think of this loss as result-
ing from international trade sanctions or restricted future access to capital markets. The
risk-neutral recovery rates market participants use for pricing emerging market sovereign
CDS range from 20% to 30% of notional, implying a significant expected loss given default.
Since a CDS contract has a value of zero at inception, the fair spread CDSTN is set
such that the value of the premium leg and the protection leg are equated. For simplicity,
I assume that payments occur only on coupon dates, even if the reference entity defaults
between two coupon dates. This greatly simplifies the analytics and has little effect on the
pricing.
The premium leg of the CDS is the expected present value of future premia CDSTN ,
which are paid for the lifetime of the swap or until the underlying reference bond defaults,
whichever is sooner. Hence, the value of the premium leg AN for a credit swap with
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maturity TN is given by the survival-adjusted discounted value of the stream of future
premium cashflows:
AN = hCDSTN
N∑
j=1
B(0, Tj)Q(Tj). (2.10)
It is clear from the definition of AN that any deterioration in the credit environment reflected
by the survival probabilities Q(Tj) will increase the value of holding protection on the
reference entity.
Similarly, we can write the value of the protection leg CN as the expected value of the
payment due upon default, adjusted by the default probabilities during each coupon period.
Since we assume that default can only occur on coupon dates, the value of the protection
leg is given by
CN = (1−R)
N∑
j=1
B(0, Tj)(Q(Tj−1)−Q(Tj)). (2.11)
Given that a CDS contract has a value of zero at inception, we require that AN−CN = 0.
Hence, the fair spread is given by
CDS(0, TN ) =
(1−R)∑Nj=1B(0, Tj)(Q(Tj−1)−Q(Tj))
h
∑N
j=1B(0, Tj)Q(Tj)
, (2.12)
where the survival probability Q(Tj) from period 0 to period Tj is given by the structural
model. In line with intuition, the CDS premium is decreasing in the sovereign recovery rate
and increasing in the default probability.
2.3 Empirical Analysis
This section empirically implements the model outlined in Section 2.2 for a set of six emerg-
ing economies: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia and Turkey. I first
discuss some salient features of the countries in the sample. Secondly, I outline a strategy
for operationalizing the ability to pay as defined in 2.1. I then calibrate the model to ob-
served sovereign CDS spreads and present the results. Lastly, I use the model to measure
the market-implied level of country liabilities.
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2.3.1 Features of the Dataset
I empirically implement the model for six emerging markets: the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Romania, Russia and Turkey. All of these sovereigns have a domestic currency
which is actively traded in the foreign exchange market. I use sovereign CDS data at
the 5 year maturity mark from Markit based on the USD-denominated contract. This
implies that the underlying deliverable obligations are bonds issued non-domestically in
a standard specified currency (USD, Euro, Yen, Canadian dollar, Franc, and Pound). In
addition to the CDS quotes, I also obtain information on the average recovery rate used by
market participants in the pricing of the contract. I use external debt data from the World
Bank Quarterly External Debt Statistics database as well as Datastream. External debt is
calculated as the total public and private debt owed to nonresidents repayable in foreign
currency, goods, or services. If the data is available, I use the stock of public and publicly
guaranteed external debt as opposed to gross public and private external debt. Exports,
imports and international reserves are available from Datastream on a monthly basis. I
augment the time series whenever possible with data from the IMF. Lastly, I use stock
market and interest rate data from Datastream and Wharton Research Data Services.
It is instructive to present country summary statistics for several variables that will be
useful in the empirical implementation. Table 2.1 reports time series averages for these
variables. The sample exhibits significant cross-sectional heterogeneity in terms of size and
CDS spreads. Clearly, the sample sovereigns differ significantly by nominal GDP. Indeed,
whereas Russia represents the 12th largest economy by GDP in 2009, Hungary ranks in 50th
place. However, all countries in the sample rely significantly on international capital flows,
as evidenced by their exports to GDP ratios. Lastly, even though the ratio of external debt
to GDP does not vary strongly cross-sectionally, the average level of CDS spreads ranges
from 37bps in the case of the Czech Republic to 332bps for Turkey. It should be noted that
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics: This table reports time series averages from Jan-2001
to Dec-2009. GDP is reported in $bn nominal terms. The CDS spread is measured at the
5 year maturity mark and reported in basis points. Debt refers to a sovereign’s foreign
currency public debt. If this data is not available, debt denotes the total stock of external
debt, private and public.
GDP CDS Debt Exports
($bn) (bps) to GDP to GDP
CZE 132 37 36% 61%
HUN 106 96 31% 60%
POL 321 57 47% 28%
RON 109 167 33% 27%
RUS 846 181 32% 30%
TUR 459 332 38% 16%
the time series averages for the CDS spreads is significantly higher if we condition on the
period from 2007 - 2009.
2.3.2 Determining Ability to Pay
Recall that the ability to pay is defined as Vt = FXt + x∗t − ξi∗t . While this definition is
intuitively appealing, it is non-trivial to operationalize empirically. Hence, this section is
concerned with the estimation of x∗t , i∗t and ξ.
Recall that x∗t and i∗t are the present discounted values of future exports and imports,
discounted using stochastic discount factors mx,t+s and mi,t+s. While, a priori, one might
expect mx,t+s and mi,t+s to be equal, it will become clear below why this is not the case. It
is evident that estimating x∗t (i∗t ) requires knowledge both of the expected future evolution
of xt (it) as well as the discount factors. I will address both points below.
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2.3.2.1 Time Series Evolution of Exports and Imports
I assume that both the log of exports and the log of imports follow random walks with
drifts. Hence,
∆ log xt+1 = µx + t+1 (2.13)
∆ log it+1 = µi + νt+1, (2.14)
where t+1 and νt+1 are distributed iid normal. I empirically estimate µx and µi as the
average of monthly log changes in observed exports and imports over the sample period.
Using the dynamics specified above, we can easily compute the s-period ahead optimal
linear forecast of the level of exports and imports:3
Etxt+s = xtesµx , (2.15)
Etit+s = itesµi . (2.16)
Finally, we can express the present value of future exports and imports as
x∗t = Et
[ ∞∑
s=0
mx,t+sxte
sµx
]
, (2.17)
i∗t = Et
[ ∞∑
s=0
mi,t+site
sµi
]
. (2.18)
Given a specification for the stochastic discount factors, it is straightforward to compute
the above expressions.
2.3.2.2 Discount Factors
Since exports and imports are non-traded quantities, estimating mx,t+s and mi,t+s is non-
trivial. For tractability, I assume that both discount factors are constant through time and
3The derivation for exports is as follows. The optimal s-period ahead linear forecast of the level of log
exports is given by Et
[
log xt + sµx +
∑s
v=1 t+v
]
. Applying the exponential transformation on both sides
and ignoring the Jensen’s term yields the result. Lutkepohl and Xu (2009) show that this naive forecast
may perform as well or better than the true optimal forecast in the presence of specification and estimation
uncertainty.
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given by mx and mi. An extension of this model with time-varying risk premia is left for
future research.
Furthermore, I assume that the World CAPM holds for equity markets. Hence, there
is no segmentation among markets and country-specific risk is completely diversifiable. In
turn, this implies that the only source of global systematic equity risk is the world market
portfolio. Thus, the returns to the claims on future exports and imports x∗t and i∗t are
spanned by one existing tradable asset, the market portfolio.
Let rxt and r
i
t denote the percentage return to x
∗
t and i
∗
t respectively. Since log changes
in both exports and imports are random walks, we have that
rxt =
x∗t − x∗t−1
x∗t−1
=
xt − xt−1
xt−1
, (2.19)
rit =
i∗t − i∗t−1
i∗t−1
=
it − it−1
it−1
. (2.20)
Hence, under the World CAPM it must be that
E(rxt − rf ) = βxE(rmt − rf ), (2.21)
E(rit − rf ) = βiE(rmt − rf ), (2.22)
where the world market portfolio return is given by rmt and r
f denotes the riskless rate.
Equations 2.21 and 2.22 state that the expected excess returns, i.e. the risk premia, of x∗t
and i∗t are linearly related to the world risk premium. Hence, given knowledge of βx and
βi, we can easily compute the appropriate export (import) risk premia and thus discount
factors. Letting λ = E(rmt − rt) and assuming continuously compounded returns, we have
that (
mx
mi
)
=
(
e−βxΛ−rf
e−βiΛ−rf
)
. (2.23)
The country-specific discount factors for exports and imports are thus given by the riskfree
discount rate plus a risk premium adjustment, which depends linearly on the β coefficients.
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It is easy to see that, once we have estimated βx, βi, rf and λ, we can compute the present
value of exports and imports in closed form. Indeed, x∗t and i∗t are given by the following
Gordon-type formulae:4
x∗t =
xt
rf + βxΛ− µx , (2.24)
i∗t =
it
rf + βiΛ− µi . (2.25)
I empirically estimate βx and βi using ordinary least squares time series regressions at the
quarterly frequency. I use as a proxy for the world market portfolio return the percentage
return of the MSCI World Index, denoted in $US. The US 30 Day T-Bill yield serves as a
proxy for the riskless rate. For each of the countries in the sample, I estimate
rjt − rf = α+ βj
(
rmt − rf
)
+ t, (2.26)
where j ∈ {x, i}. The sample period covers Jan-1990 to Feb-2010. Lastly, I estimate λ as
the average excess total return of the MSCI World Index from Dec-1969 to Feb-2010 at the
monthly frequency.
Table 2.2 reports the results of this analysis. It is evident from Panel A that for most
countries, the β-coefficients are significant at the 10% level for both imports and exports.
Furthermore, all estimated coefficients are positive, implying that the returns to x∗t and i∗t
are strongly pro-cyclical. A look at the sovereigns’ export and import composition may help
in explaining this finding. In the case of Hungary, for example, pro-cyclical durables such
as machinery and transport equipment account on average for 59% of exports and 40% of
imports (in the period 2001–2005). Panel B reports the world equity premium, as proxied
by the average excess return of the MSCI World index, as 0.48% on a monthly basis, which
equates to 5.74% annually. Although smaller in magnitude than the US equity premium,
4In fact, x∗t =
xt
1−eµx−βxΛ−rf . However, for small values of a variable y, we can approximate e
y ' 1 + y.
Rewriting, we get the classic Gordon formula.
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Table 2.2: β-Exposures and Risk Premia: Panel A reports the coefficient estimate,
standard error and R2 of the regression rjt − rf = α + βj(rmt − rf ) + t, where j denotes
either exports or imports, rf is the 30-Day US Treasury Bill yield and rm denotes the return
on the MSCI World Index. The sample period is Jan-1990 to Feb-2010 at the quarterly
frequency. Panel B reports the average monthly cum-dividend return of the MSCI World
minus the 30-Day US Treasury Bill yield from Dec-1969 to Feb-2010. Panel C computes
the discount rates for exports and imports, given by E(rjt ) = rf + βjΛ.
CZE HUN POL ROM RUS TUR
Panel A
Export Return
Beta 0.46 0.55 0.31 0.23 0.35 0.26
SE 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.16
R2 0.12 0.13 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.03
Import Return
Beta 0.45 0.45 0.40 0.45 0.40 0.38
SE 0.21 0.17 0.23 0.31 0.21 0.19
R2 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.05
Panel B
MSCI World
λ 0.48%
E(rf ) 0.46%
Panel C
Expected Returns
Exp. 0.68% 0.72% 0.61% 0.57% 0.63% 0.58%
Imp. 0.68% 0.68% 0.65% 0.67% 0.65% 0.64%
the estimated value is in line with existing literature on the world equity premium. Using
the point estimates reported in Panel A and the estimates for λ and the average riskfree
rate in Panel B, I compute the export and import discount rates rf + βxλ and rf + βiλ in
Panel C. The estimated discount rates fall in a relatively tight range, from 6.29% to 8.68%
annually. Using these values, as well as estimates for µx and µi, we can now compute the
value of Equations 2.24 and 2.25.
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2.3.2.3 Determination of ξ
The previous sections outlined how to estimate the present value of future exports and
imports, x∗t and i∗t . The last element needed to compute the ability to pay Vt is the
parameter ξ. Recall that ξ represents the portion of imports that is implicitly tied to
exports (e.g. raw materials and intermediate goods). The remaining 1 − ξ fraction of
imports can be relinquished in case a sovereign needs to raise foreign capital in times of
distress.
It is difficult to estimate ξ empirically since it is not an observable quantity. While, in
principle, one could analyze the commodity composition of a sovereign’s imports and thus
imply a proxy value of ξ, it would likely involve a significant degree of subjective judgement.
Hence, I treat ξ as a free parameter and calibrate it to provide the best fit between the
model and market CDS spreads.
2.3.3 Calibration
In this section I calibrate the model to market data by searching over different values of
ξ to minimize pricing errors. The model is implemented at a monthly frequency using
the dataset discussed in Section 2.3.1. The sample period under consideration is January
2001 to February 2010, but differs slightly across countries due to data availability. The
calibration is implemented as follows. First, I fix ξ between 0 and 1. Given ξ, I empirically
determine all relevant pricing parameters in the model:
{Vt, νt, σ, R} . (2.27)
Lastly, I use the model to price a sovereign CDS at the 5 year maturity and compute the
pricing errors between the model-implied and market CDS spreads. I then calibrate ξ to
minimize the average absolute pricing error over the sample. Below, I outline in detail the
determination of the parameters in Equation 2.27.
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Each month I compute Vt as the ξ-adjusted difference between the present value of
future exports and imports plus the current period foreign exchange reserves. Using the
Gordon formulae derived in Equations 2.24 and 2.25, Vt is given by
Vt = FXt +
xt
rf + βxΛ− µx − ξ
it
rf + βiΛ− µi , (2.28)
where βx, βi and Λ are kept constant over the sample at their estimated values, given in
Section 2.3.2.2. The export and import growth rates µx and µi are estimated from log-
changes in country exports and imports over the sample.5 The international reserves FXt
are taken directly from the data. Putting this together, we can construct the monthly
time-series of Vt.
Having computed the sovereign’s ability to pay, I now turn to the default threshold,
νt = k¯B(t, T ). I use as a proxy for k¯ the total amount of outstanding external debt,
measured at the quarterly horizon. Since the timing of the model is monthly, I update the
value of k¯ at the beginning of each quarter and keep it constant until the next quarter.
In this model there is only one outstanding debt issue per sovereign. Hence, I set the
maturity parameter T equal to each country’s average external debt maturity. The 30 Day
US Treasury Bill yield is used as a proxy for the instantaneous riskfree rate r.
Finally, we need to estimate σ, the volatility of Vt, as well as the recovery rate, R. I use
as an estimate for σ the 90-month rolling volatility of log changes in Vt, but note that the
results are quantitatively similar if σ is fixed over the entire sample. The recovery rate R is
set to the average recovery rate used by market participants, which differs across sovereigns
and averages 20% cross-sectionally.
Using the methodology outlined above, I calibrate the model to minimize the average
5The Gordon formulae are only valid if rf + βxΛ > µx and rf + βiΛ > µi. In empirical implementations,
however, this condition is not guaranteed. Hence I assume that an emerging sovereign’s export (import)
growth rate will converge to an ‘average’ growth rate as the economy matures, given by average annual
world GDP growth of 2%.
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Table 2.3: Calibrated Values of ξ: The calibration minimizes the average absolute basis
point difference between model-implied and market CDS spreads over the sample period by
searching over ξ.
Country ξ
CZE 37.17%
HUN 33.27%
POL 29.62%
ROM 33.40%
RUS 64.54%
TUR 17.35%
Avg 35.89%
absolute pricing error between model-implied and market CDS spreads for each country.
Table 2.3 reports the results of the calibration. For all countries in the sample, the cali-
bration converges with an interior solution for ξ. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland
and Romania have similar values of ξ, in line with the notion that these sovereigns have
comparable economies. It is important to note that an economic interpretation of these
numbers is difficult since ξ is an unobservable quantity. The average absolute calibration
pricing errors are discussed in detail in 2.3.4 (see Table 2.4).
2.3.4 Results
In this section I discuss the results of the calibrated model. First, I show that the aver-
age absolute pricing errors of the model are generally small and that model-implied and
market CDS spreads are highly correlated. Secondly, I show that the estimates of Vt are
economically reasonable. Lastly, I argue that the model can capture the significant increase
in spreads during the recent financial crisis.
I report the average absolute model pricing errors in Table 2.4. Given that the dynamics
of the model are driven purely by changes in macro-economic fundamentals and do not
incorporate any market data, such as bond yields or stock market returns, the fit of the
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model is surprisingly good.6 Indeed, for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, the
average pricing errors are below 31bps across the sample. It should also be noted that
the period under consideration was partly characterized by very high levels of volatility.
Nevertheless, most countries in the sample exhibit a strong positive correlation between
the market and model-implied CDS spreads. This indicates that, in addition to the level,
Table 2.4: Model Pricing Errors and Correlations: The model pricing error (PE) is
defined as the average absolute basis point difference between model-implied and market
CDS spreads. The correlation column reports the correlation coefficient of model-implied
and market CDS spreads.
Country PE Corr.
CZE 19.39 0.78
HUN 30.77 0.92
POL 26.02 0.75
RON 78.20 0.76
RUS 86.66 0.65
TUR 227.59 0.23
the model also provides a reasonable characterization of the time-series dynamics of CDS
spreads. This is especially true for Hungary, where the correlation between model and
market spreads exceeds 90%. The model does not provide a satisfactory fit for Turkey, with
an average absolute pricing error of 230bps and a model-market CDS spread correlation of
23%. This may be partially attributable to the fact that Turkey is among the most developed
countries in the sample. In fact, Turkey is often classified as a newly industrialized nation.
Thus, the drivers of Turkey’s economy may be different - average exports as a percentage
of GDP, for example, are merely 16%, compared to Hungary’s 60% (see Table 2.1).
While the pricing errors of the model are generally small, it is important to examine
6Note that ∆Vt = a∆xt− b∆it + ∆FXt for constants a and b, so that changes in Vt are driven primarily
by changes in the model fundamentals: exports, imports and reserves. Since all fundamentals in this model
are $US denominated, exchange rate volatility also plays a role.
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whether one of the main variables driving the performance of the model, the ability to pay,
is economically reasonable.
Firstly, I compare the estimated time series of Vt to a different proxy for the country
wealth process: the domestic stock market. Lehrbass (1999) argues that the discounted fu-
ture stream of a country’s GDP is a good indicator of the sovereign’s asset value. Since, on
average, corporate profits are a large part of GDP, and the stock market value is a function
of the present discount value of future profits, the $US-denominated value of the domestic
stock market index is a proxy for the value of underlying assets in foreign currency. Figure
Figure 2.1: Ability to Pay and Country Index (Hungary): This figure plots the
time series of Hungary’s ability to pay and a measure of the local stock market, the MSCI
Hungary. Both quantities are measured in $US.
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2.1 shows the time-series performance of the $US-denominated MSCI country index for
Hungary. Although not perfectly correlated, it is evident that Vt captures the economic im-
provement from 2001 to 2007 as well as the significant downturn in 2008 and the subsequent
late-2009/early-2010 recovery.
Secondly, to ascertain the relative magnitude of Vt in each country, I compute the
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average annual ratio of the ability to pay relative to nominal GDP. Table 2.5 reports the
results, as well as the volatility of the log changes of Vt over the sample. For most countries
Table 2.5: Ability to Pay and Volatility: This table reports the time series average
of the ability to pay relative to GDP from Jan-2001 to Dec-2009. σ is computed as the
annualized standard deviation of log changes of V over the sample. The country-specific
value of ξ is set to its calibrated level.
V/GDP σ
CZE 6.46 47%
HUN 2.06 37%
POL 3.32 39%
RON 1.93 36%
RUS 1.78 29%
TUR 1.31 38%
in the sample, the average ratio of the ability to pay relative to GDP seems economically
reasonable. Recall that Vt denotes the maximum amount of foreign currency a sovereign
could access in times of distress - hence, the ability to pay is an upper bound to the sovereign
wealth process. In the case of the Czech Republic, the ratio seems rather high. While it is
difficult to judge whether a ratio of Vt to GDP of 6.5 is too high, I point to the fact that
the Czech Republic has the largest share of exports relative to GDP of the six sovereigns
(see Table 2.1).
The third column in Table 2.5 reports the volatility of Vt over the sample. Somewhat
surprisingly, σ is large in magnitude for all sovereigns, ranging from 29% per annum for
Russia to 47% per annum for the Czech Republic. In fact, in this model the volatility
of the underlying macro-economic fundamentals is further augmented by present-valuing
the infinite stream of future exports and imports each period. The level of σ is a large
contributing factor to the overall fit of the model.
In the discussion above, I show that the model fits well in terms of pricing errors and
61
that the resulting values of Vt are economically reasonable. Lastly, I analyze the time series
behavior of the model CDS spreads vis-a`-vis their market equivalents. Figures 2.2 and 2.3
plot the time series of the ability to pay Vt, the level of external debt k¯ as well as the
model-implied and market CDS spreads.
The figures visually reaffirm that a model of sovereign CDS spreads based only on macro-
economic fundamentals provides a reasonable fit to market data. In particular, Figure 2.2
shows that the model captures a large part of the spread widening during 2001 and 2002 as
well as during 2007 and 2008 for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Interestingly,
we also capture the spread tightening in late 2009 as a result of economic recovery and the
subsequent widening in early 2010 when concerns about Greece’s debt sustainability came
to the fore. In Figure 2.3, we still capture the increase in spreads during 2007 and 2008,
but the model significantly overshoots in the case of Turkey. Similarly, the pricing errors
for Romania are large in the beginning of the sample. On the other hand, we capture well
the periods of turmoil in the early and late 2000s in Russia.
Moreover, this model allows us to disentangle the significant increase in CDS spreads
during the recent financial crisis as a function of macro-economic fundamentals. For all
countries in the sample, the ability to pay shows a significant deterioration in mid-2008. This
was a direct result of the global economic downturn, which significantly impacted the flow of
international trade in emerging economies. Simultaneously, several countries in the sample
experienced pronounced currency devaluations and, seeking foreign exchange stabilization,
depleted parts of their international reserves. The confluence of these factors resulted in a
plunge in sovereigns’ ability to pay. With a high level of external debt accumulated through
the previous years, and the stock of debt essentially fixed in the short run, countries’ CDS
spreads spiked. For all six emerging nations in the sample, the model does a good job in
fitting the run-up in sovereign CDS spreads during the recent crisis.
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2.3.5 Implied External Liabilities
In this section, I offer a different interpretation of the pricing errors discussed in Section
2.3.4. The sovereign CDS spread is crucially affected by the default boundary νt and thus
by the face value of external debt, k¯. In the previous analysis, I have taken the value of
external debt directly from the data. However, this only serves as a proxy for the true value
of sovereign liabilities - additional leverage in the form of guarantees and subsidies to the
private sector or other nations may be priced in for sovereign CDS spreads but may not be
observable in the data. Under the assumption that the model is an accurate description of
the data and that pricing errors are primarily related to the mismeasurement of outstanding
liabilities, I solve for the face value of external debt that sets to zero the monthly difference
between model-implied and market CDS spreads. In effect, this allows us to transform the
pricing errors from basis points into the level of debt in $US.
Table 2.6: Model-Implied and Observed External Debt: This table reports the ob-
served and model-implied value of outstanding debt in $bn. The country-specific value of
ξ is set to its calibrated level.
Country Imp. Obs. (1)/(2)
CZE 55.13 49.72 1.11
HUN 37.34 35.13 1.06
POL 183.21 151.52 1.21
ROM 47.71 42.42 1.12
RUS 421.56 324.94 1.30
TUR 180.19 184.09 0.98
Table 2.6 reports the average level of external debt as taken from the data, as well as
the average level of implied debt. Interestingly, the model suggests that, on average, the
value of external liabilities is too low to justify the level of market CDS spreads. This
65
020
00
0
40
00
0
60
00
0
80
00
0
10
00
00
12
00
00
14
00
00
16
00
00
18
00
00
20
00
00 Fe
b-
01 J
ul-
01 No
v-0
1 Ma
r-0
2 Au
g-
02 D
ec
-0
2 Ap
r-0
3 Au
g-
03 Ja
n-
04 Ma
y-0
4 Se
p-
04 Ja
n-
05 Ju
n-
05 O
ct-
05 Fe
b-
06 J
ul-
06 No
v-0
6 Ma
r-0
7 Ju
l-0
7 De
c-0
7 Ap
r-0
8 Au
g-
08 D
ec
-0
8 Ma
y-0
9 Se
p-
09 Ja
n-
10
$mm
Im
pl
ie
d
O
bs
er
ve
d
(a
)
C
ze
ch
R
ep
u
b
li
c
0
10
00
0
20
00
0
30
00
0
40
00
0
50
00
0
60
00
0
70
00
0
80
00
0
Ma
r-0
2 J
ul-
02 N
ov
-0
2 Ma
r-0
3 J
ul-
03 N
ov
-0
3 Ma
r-0
4 J
ul-
04 N
ov
-0
4 Ma
r-0
5 J
ul-
05 N
ov
-0
5 Ma
r-0
6 J
ul-
06 N
ov
-0
6 Ma
r-0
7 J
ul-
07 O
ct-
07 F
eb
-0
8 Ju
n-
08 O
ct-
08 F
eb
-0
9 Ju
n-
09 O
ct-
09 F
eb
-1
0
$mm
Im
pl
ie
d
O
bs
er
ve
d
(b
)
H
u
n
g
a
ry
0
50
00
0
10
00
00
15
00
00
20
00
00
25
00
00
30
00
00
35
00
00
40
00
00
45
00
00
50
00
00 Ja
n-
01 J
un
-0
1 Oc
t-0
1 Fe
b-
02
Ju
l-0
2 No
v-0
2 Ma
r-0
3 Ju
l-0
3 De
c-0
3 Ap
r-0
4 Au
g-
04 D
ec
-0
4 Ma
y-0
5 Se
p-
05 J
an
-0
6 Ju
n-
06 O
ct-
06 F
eb
-0
7 Ju
n-
07 N
ov
-0
7 Ma
r-0
8 Ju
l-0
8 No
v-0
8 Ap
r-0
9 Au
g-
09 D
ec
-0
9
$mm
Im
pl
ie
d
O
bs
er
ve
d
(c
)
P
o
la
n
d
F
ig
ur
e
2.
4:
O
b
se
rv
ed
an
d
M
o
d
el
-I
m
p
li
ed
D
eb
t
L
ev
el
s
(C
ze
ch
R
ep
u
b
li
c,
H
u
n
ga
ry
an
d
P
ol
an
d
):
T
hi
s
fig
ur
e
pl
ot
s
th
e
m
od
el
-i
m
pl
ie
d
an
d
ob
se
rv
ed
le
ve
lo
f
so
ve
re
ig
n
ex
te
rn
al
de
bt
.
T
he
im
pl
ie
d
va
lu
e
of
de
bt
is
th
e
le
ve
lo
f
ex
te
rn
al
de
bt
th
at
eq
ua
te
s
m
ar
ke
t
an
d
m
od
el
-i
m
pl
ie
d
so
ve
re
ig
n
C
D
S
sp
re
ad
s.
T
he
co
un
tr
y-
sp
ec
ifi
c
va
lu
e
of
ξ
is
se
t
to
it
s
ca
lib
ra
te
d
le
ve
l.
66
020
00
0
40
00
0
60
00
0
80
00
0
10
00
00
12
00
00 Ja
n-
03 M
ay
-0
3 Se
p-
03 J
an
-0
4 Ma
y-0
4 Se
p-
04 J
an
-0
5 Ma
y-0
5 Se
p-
05 J
an
-0
6 Ma
y-0
6 Se
p-
06 J
an
-0
7 Ma
y-0
7 Se
p-
07 J
an
-0
8 Ma
y-0
8 Se
p-
08 D
ec
-0
8 Ap
r-0
9 Au
g-
09 D
ec
-0
9
$mm
Im
pl
ie
d
O
bs
er
ve
d
(a
)
R
o
m
a
n
ia
0
20
00
00
40
00
00
60
00
00
80
00
00
10
00
00
0
12
00
00
0
Ma
r-0
3 J
ul-
03 N
ov
-0
3 M
ar
-0
4 J
ul-
04 N
ov
-0
4 M
ar
-0
5 J
ul-
05 N
ov
-0
5 M
ar
-0
6 J
ul-
06 N
ov
-0
6 M
ar
-0
7 J
ul-
07 N
ov
-0
7 M
ar
-0
8 J
ul-
08
Oc
t-0
8 Fe
b-
09
Ju
n-
09
Oc
t-0
9 Fe
b-
10
$mm
Im
pl
ie
d
O
bs
er
ve
d
(b
)
R
u
ss
ia
0
50
00
0
10
00
00
15
00
00
20
00
00
25
00
00
30
00
00
35
00
00 Ja
n-
01 J
un
-0
1 Oc
t-0
1 Fe
b-
02 J
ul-
02 N
ov
-0
2 Ma
r-0
3 Ju
l-0
3 De
c-0
3 Ap
r-0
4 Au
g-
04 D
ec
-0
4 Ma
y-0
5 Se
p-
05 J
an
-0
6 Ju
n-
06 O
ct-
06 F
eb
-0
7 Ju
n-
07 N
ov
-0
7 Ma
r-0
8 Ju
l-0
8 No
v-0
8 Ap
r-0
9 Au
g-
09 D
ec
-0
9
$mm
Im
pl
ie
d
O
bs
er
ve
d
(c
)
T
u
rk
ey
F
ig
ur
e
2.
5:
O
b
se
rv
ed
an
d
M
o
d
el
-I
m
p
li
ed
D
eb
t
L
ev
el
s
(R
om
an
ia
,
R
u
ss
ia
an
d
T
u
rk
ey
):
T
hi
s
fig
ur
e
pl
ot
s
th
e
m
od
el
-
im
pl
ie
d
an
d
ob
se
rv
ed
le
ve
lo
f
so
ve
re
ig
n
ex
te
rn
al
de
bt
.
T
he
im
pl
ie
d
va
lu
e
of
de
bt
is
th
e
le
ve
lo
f
ex
te
rn
al
de
bt
th
at
eq
ua
te
s
m
ar
ke
t
an
d
m
od
el
-i
m
pl
ie
d
so
ve
re
ig
n
C
D
S
sp
re
ad
s.
T
he
co
un
tr
y-
sp
ec
ifi
c
va
lu
e
of
ξ
is
se
t
to
it
s
ca
lib
ra
te
d
le
ve
l.
67
is true for all countries in the sample except Turkey. In fact, external liabilities should be
roughly 13% higher than their reported levels if we want to match observed CDS spreads.
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show the time-series behavior of the level of model-implied external
debt. The implied value of debt is significantly more volatile than the actual value due
to the possibility that the model pricing errors may be affected by many other factors.
Nevertheless, these figures are instructive as a visualization of pricing errors. For the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Turkey the implied values of k¯ track closely the
actual stock of external debt, except during the recent crisis. In the case of Romania,
the implied value of debt is generally higher than the observed value, which reflects the
fact that the model underprices Romanian sovereign CDS in the beginning of the sample
period. In future research, it may be of interest to explicitly include government subsidies
and guarantees in a structural model of sovereign credit risk.
2.4 Conclusion
This paper develops and applies a structural model of sovereign credit risk based on macro-
economic fundamentals. The model is based on a sovereign’s access to international capital
through exports, imports and international reserves. I define a country’s ability to pay as
the maximum amount of foreign currency available for repayment of external debt. The
ability to pay is increasing in the present value of future export as well as the current
period foreign exchange reserves, and decreasing in the present value of future imports. In
the model, the joint dynamics of the ability to pay and a sovereign’s outstanding external
debt determine the level of country default risk and thus the CDS spread. The model
is empirically tractable and implemented for a sample of 6 emerging economies (Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Turkey) for a period covering the recent
financial crisis. A calibrated version of the model captures the widening of sovereign spreads
68
during the crisis and provides a good fit for the time-series dynamics of CDS spreads. For
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, the average absolute model pricing errors are
below 31bps. Furthermore, the correlation between model-implied and market CDS spreads
is positive for all countries, and above 65% for five of them. Lastly, I use the model to
measure the market-implied level of country liabilities. On average, the value of implied
external debt is 13% larger than the reported level of debt, which may indicate the presence
of implicit or explicit off-balance sheet guarantees.
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